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1 
Washington University 
Journal of Law & Policy 
Access to Justice:  
The Promise and Pitfalls of Social  
Problem Solving through the Courts 
and Legal Advocacy 
Introduction 
Annette R. Appell  
The occasion for this symposium was Washington University 
School of Law’s Ninth Annual Access to Equal Justice Colloquium, 
an interdisciplinary gathering, predominately of law-trained 
professionals and academics, but including social workers, capital 
defense mitigation specialists, engineers, and environmental 
scientists. This particular gathering, which reflected most of the law 
school’s client-based clinics1 and was grounded in the social aspects 
of legal problems—or perhaps more accurately the regulation of 
social problems—served as a forum to grapple with the persistence 
and limitations of legalistic approaches to social issues. The papers in 
this volume, although written by law professors, portray the promises 
 
 
 Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Clinical Affairs, Washington University 
School of Law.  
 1. These clinics involve a diverse array of matters and approaches, nearly all of them 
employing interdisciplinary personnel and approaches to teaching, representation and public 
policy problems. The Interdisciplinary Environmental Clinic, Intellectual Property and 
Nonprofit Organizations Clinic, Civil Justice Clinic, and the Criminal Justice Clinic organized 
panels for the colloquium. 
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and pitfalls in interdisciplinary approaches to problem solving and 
dispute resolution. 
The colloquium traditionally dovetails with the school’s annual 
year-long Pubic Interest Law and Policy Speakers Series. The series 
and the colloquium take seriously the academy’s engagement with 
public policy and the school’s commitment to critically assessing 
both access to and the quality of justice.
2
 Law and Policy Speaker 
Professor Jane Spinak’s talk, ―Reforming Family Court: Getting It 
Right between Rhetoric and Reality,‖ served as the keynote for the 
colloquium. Her talk helped frame the colloquium’s focus on 
interdisciplinary approaches in the law. Professors Spinak, Leigh 
Goodmark, and Mae Quinn contributed provocative papers that 
individually and collectively illustrate and confront head-on the 
irrepressible faith in the problem-solving court, in which the judge 
serves as ―team-leader‖ rather than rights protector,3 and the cyclical 
renewal of these courts even after, and in spite of, their failures. The 
papers, which are included as Articles in this volume, question the 
validity of these dispute resolution models the law employs to solve 
problems rather than adjudicate rights, particularly in the context of 
problem-solving courts such as family and juvenile courts, domestic 
violence courts, mental health courts, and criminal drug and gun 
 
 2. Organized by Karen Tokarz, Charles Nagel Professor of Public Interest Law & Public 
Service, the 2008–2009 series and colloquium delivered on this promise. Professor Terry Smith 
of Fordham University kicked off the series with a talk ―Politics and Post-Racialism: 
Reflections on the Meaning of a Black President.‖ Other speakers included Professor Michael 
Pinard, University of Maryland, speaking on ―The Civil Rights Dimensions of Prisoner 
Reentry: the Impact on Individuals, Families, and Communities,‖ Mary Gade, Former EPA 
Administrator, on ―The Seven Dirty Words You Can Never Use at the EPA: Thoughts for a 
New Administration,‖ Professor Philippe Sands, University College London on the ―Torture 
Team: Rumsfeld’s Memo and the Betrayal of American Values,‖ Professor Jay Folberg, 
University of San Francisco, on ―New Trends and Challenges in ADR Here and Around the 
World,‖ New York Times immigration reporter Julia Preston, speaking on ―Immigration: 
Enough Enforcement? The Crackdown and the Policy Options for the New Administration,‖ 
Professor Goodwin Liu, University of California-Berkeley, on ―The Future of Civil Rights: 
Reflections and Renewal,‖ and Evan Wolfson addressed ―Why Marriage Matters: America, 
Equality, and Gay People’s Right to Marry.‖ 
 3. Jane M. Spinak, Reforming Family Court: Getting It Right between Rhetoric and 
Reality, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11 (2009); Leigh Goodmark, Reframing Domestic Violence 
Law and Policy: An Anti-Essentialist Proposal, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39 (2009); Mae C. 
Quinn, The Modern Problem-Solving Court Movement: Domination of Discourse and Untold 
Stories of Criminal Justice Reform, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 57 (2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/2
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courts, and even smoking courts. Each Article calls for assessment 
and accountability of these tribunals. That is to say the Articles call 
for proof, rather than stereotypes and anecdotes, that these courts 
actually can and do solve problems.
4
  
The other two Articles provide original assessments of legal 
approaches to problem solving in the context of environmental 
justice, an area that often is more focused on group interests than 
individual rights. Liz Hubertz’s Article analyzes the ethical 
obligations of interdisciplinary practice among environmental 
lawyers and engineers,
5
 a welcome addition to a growing 
interdisciplinary practice literature regarding lawyers and social 
workers.
6
 Helen Kang’s Article addresses the flip-side of problem-
solving courts: litigating problems that are so legally complex and 
affect so many constituents that it is difficult to identify the problem-
solving mechanism, even if the problem is precisely defined.
7
 Taken 
together, all of the Articles illustrate the challenges and promises of 
interdisciplinary approaches in legal settings. 
I. PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 
Problem-solving courts were created as antidotes to, or reforms of, 
the punitive, legalistic, and often unresponsive approaches of civil 
and criminal courts to problems arising in intimate relationships, out 
of youthful conduct or vulnerability, and as a result of mental health 
issues, including drug addiction. The reforms themselves, however, 
inexorably present new problems that call for reform. This rhythm 
highlights the danger of seemingly benign, but overreaching, 
interventions of problem-solving courts, and it exposes the inevitable 
 
 4. Spinak calls for ―systematic analysis.‖ Spinak, supra note 3, at 21. 
 5. Elizabeth J. Hubertz, Public Interest, Professional Bargains: Ethical Conflicts 
between Lawyers and Professional Engineers, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83 (2009). 
 6. E.g., Alexis Anderson, Lynn Barenberg & Paul R. Tremblay, Professional Ethics in 
Interdisciplinary Collaboratives: Zeal, Paternalism and Mandated Reporting, 13 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 659, 711–18 (2007); Maryann Zavez, The Ethical and Moral Considerations Presented by 
Lawyer/Social Worker Interdisciplinary Collaborations, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 
191 (2005); Jacqueline St. Joan, Building Bridges, Building Walls: Collaboration Between 
Lawyers and Social Workers in a Domestic Violence Clinic, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 403, 437–39 
(2001). 
 7. Helen H. Kang, Pursuing Environmental Justice: Obstacles and Opportunities—
Lessons from the Field, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 121 (2009). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 31:1 
 
 
tensions of blending legal and psycho-social approaches to social 
problems, a combination that masks the interdependence of legal 
rights and therapeutic state intervention.  
The juvenile courts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries were perhaps the earliest problem-solving courts; the 
narrative power of these and subsequent generations of problem-
solving courts is strong and tenacious, as Mae Quinn and Jane 
Spinak’s Articles attest.8 We want to believe that there is a role for 
judicial intervention and regulation that is kind and gentle, and which 
need not be unduly constrained by individual rights. Collectively, we 
seem to understand that punitive and resolute adjudicative responses 
are inappropriate and even harmful for problems the law constructs as 
personal and domestic, victimless or youthful—problems such as 
drug use, delinquency, child neglect, and domestic violence. Yet, 
according to the Articles in this volume, we are unable to develop 
adjudicative systems that address these problems in productive, 
respectful, and meaningful ways. These failures and the structural 
challenges posed by courts that expand their reach beyond 
adjudicating facts and protecting rights raise difficult questions that 
demand further study and answers. These Articles forcefully advance 
this inquiry. 
More fundamentally, the Articles raise questions regarding the 
methodological differences between social science and law (and, in 
the case of Liz Hubertz’s Article, scientists and lawyers).9 These 
differences, all centered on the issues of assessment, present at least 
three quandaries or themes. One relates to the different 
methodologies of the law and social sciences. The second, related to 
the first, is the discipline of assessment, an integral aspect of science, 
but not of legal and dispute resolution. Third, legal approaches to 
assessment appear to be descriptive and at best quantitative, not 
qualitative. 
The first quandary relates to veracity. Unlike legal studies, 
science, the study of social and natural problems and phenomena, is 
ever refining itself. Theoretical understanding or approaches to these 
 
 8. Spinak, supra note 3; Quinn, supra note 3. 
 9. Hubertz, supra note 5 (examining the different loyalties of engineers and lawyers, the 
former to the public and the latter to their client). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/2
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phenomena are in a constant state of assessment, refinement, and 
recalibration. Hypotheses are tested and may evolve into theories, 
which are then tested and refined, often through empirical studies. 
The law, however, operates through entirely different processes. It is 
the product of a discourse that occurs in and through democratic 
political and judicial processes, which have a different sort of rigor 
than the social sciences. Scientific assessments rarely are present in 
the courts, as Spinak’s Article illustrates.10 Instead, the process of 
refinement of law and judicial systems occurs in legislatures, voting 
booths, and administrative agencies. It is difficult to discern non-
localized peer groups that monitor and assess legal and judicial 
performance. The American Bar Association and other national 
organizations that regard courts and judges
11
 serve normative, 
educational, and resource functions, but these are not scientific or 
peer-review bodies.  
Second, and relatedly, is the quandary of accountability. While the 
academy has various methods of accountability—primarily peer 
review—the accountability for courts is often in the form of 
caseloads and length of time to case closure, and in some cases 
accountability to the public, as when judges make unpopular 
decisions.
12
  
This limited accountability surfaces as a theme of the Articles, 
which highlight the failure of these problem-solving courts to take 
their cues from the people whose problems they purport to solve and 
suggest that courts should be more cognizant of and accountable to 
the parties before them.  
Professor Spinak exposes how the elaborate and expensive efforts 
of the national and local bars and judicial organizations to improve 
the juvenile and family courts merely count and describe the 
 
 10. Spinak, supra note 3, at 19. 
 11. E.g., The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, The Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, The National Center for State Courts, the U.S. Dept. of Health and Human 
Services Administration for Youth and Families. 
 12. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 458 (2004) 
(―Accountability also provides a democratic check in the substantive development of the law, at 
least at the higher levels of the judiciary. A judge who is too liberal or too conservative, too 
coddling of criminals or too favorable toward the prosecution, can face criticism for those 
decisions and possibly sanction from the voters.‖). 
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programs, rather than assess what value these projects are adding and 
whether they are in fact improving outcomes.
13
 Spinak highlights the 
absence of family and youth narratives regarding both the process 
and outcomes.
14
 On a more fundamental level, Spinak reveals that the 
question of ―what value . . . the family court add[s] when it intervenes 
in a family’s life‖15 is not assessed and does not appear to be part of 
the conception of court improvement.
16
  
Similarly, Leigh Goodmark explores the difficulties inherent in 
developing law and policy when the theoretical and empirical 
understandings of social problems, such as domestic violence, are 
unstable—ever in the process of being assessed, refined, and 
updated.
17
 For example, judges are caught in a legal structure that 
characterizes domestic violence first and foremost as about physical 
harm and as a cycle that trains women to be passive and helpless and 
men to be all-controlling. Yet social scientists have identified a more 
fundamental and often more damaging harm than the violence itself: 
the loss of liberty for women in abusive relationships.
18
 Goodmark 
exposes this reductive forensic understanding of domestic violence as 
one that constructs women as passive victims, a model that does not 
necessarily reflect women’s lived experiences of and responses to 
domestic violence. As a result, the victim who fights back or who 
wishes merely to be safe, but not to separate from her abuser, is 
anathema to the problem-solving domestic violence court, which 
reductively defines the problem as removing the abuser from the 
woman’s life. These women’s goals may be to preserve family or 
keep food on the table or a roof over their heads, rather than to exile 
or imprison the abuser.
19
 Goodmark’s prescription, like Spinak’s, is 
to ―formulate policy around the experience of‖ the women who do 
not fit the early domestic violence model of the white middle-class 
female victim and to develop non-paternalistic remedies based on the 
 
 13. Spinak, supra note 3, at 25. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at 24. 
 16. Id. at 25. 
 17. Goodmark, supra note 3, at 44–45. 
 18. Id. at 43. 
 19. Id. at 46. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/2
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needs and desires of the women who petition the court for 
assistance.
20
  
Mae Quinn observes that there has been a proliferation (both in 
number and target problem-type) of criminal problem-solving courts 
over the past several decades, but little study of whether these courts 
actually help solve the problems of the litigants and what these courts 
cost.
21
 On the contrary, according to Quinn, the criminal defense bar 
was not part of the movement toward criminal problem-solving 
courts and has instead organized against them.
22
 Quinn shows that 
these courts were not driven by the needs of the defendants, but 
developed to resolve governmental problems such as jail and prison 
overcrowding and high judicial caseloads.
23
 Yet Quinn suggests the 
courts may be failing even those goals, and further falling far short of 
the promise of rehabilitation and non-punitive treatment.
24
  
The third quandary the papers raise relates to limiting the court’s 
reach once it becomes involved in a person’s or family’s life. Unlike 
the paradigmatic legal dispute sounding in tort, crime, or contract, 
where the facts are reasonably well contained and the cause of action 
is primarily, though not exclusively, backward-looking, the problem-
solving courts start with one issue, perhaps domestic violence, child 
neglect, youthful lawbreaking, or drug addiction, but the intervention 
does not end with an adjudication; on the contrary, an adjudication 
that the incident occurred establishes the court’s nearly unbridled 
dispositional power to seek to fix all sorts of even tangentially related 
issues.  
The indeterminacy of this authority invites all manner of 
intervention for all types of purpose. Goodmark and Quinn explain 
how the unbridled (and often one-size-fits-all) intervention in 
domestic violence cases undermines women’s autonomy and fails to 
meet their basic needs and wishes.
25
 Moreover, Quinn reveals that 
defendants in drug courts are treated more severely and sentenced to 
 
 20. Id. at 47–49. 
 21. Quinn, supra note 3, at 62–68. 
 22. Id. at 64. 
 23. Id. at 63. 
 24. Id. at 65–66. 
 25. Goodmark, supra note 3; Quinn, supra note 3, at 68. 
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longer terms than those who receive justice in traditional courts.
26
 
Spinak describes the family court judge as ―the leader of a team of 
professionals who are solving the problems of families that come to 
court.‖27 For Spinak, though, the breadth of this problem-solving 
outmatches the court’s ability and its authority, which should, as 
Spinak notes, be confined to the specific purpose that brought the 
family to court.
28
  
II. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
Unlike the more private and even intimate individual crimes, 
misdeeds, and family disputes that problem-solving courts 
contemplate, the problems of environmental justice are more public 
and involve multiple constituencies. The rights at stake relate to 
communities and polluters. Environmental justice contains a public 
accountability and responsibility that is absent from the problem-
solving court narrative. Both Helen Kang and Liz Hubertz address 
the public aspects of the environmental justice setting. For Kang, 
these public aspects make it difficult to develop compelling 
narratives, and for Hubertz, the public aspect can create ethical 
complications when lawyers and engineers collaborate in the pursuit 
of environmental justice. In any event, these differences do not result 
in courts that are more hospitable to the problems of communities 
seeking environmental justice or more empowered litigants than exist 
in the problem-solving courts in criminal or family justice.
29
 
Still, environmental justice does not carry the easy and persistent 
narrative of the problem-solving courts, which seek to solve personal 
and social problems at the expense of the law. Instead, the narratives 
in environmental justice are legalistic, more elusive, less reductive. 
Helen Kang rehearses the difficulties in developing compelling 
environmental justice narratives because of the piecemeal and highly 
technical methods of resolving environmental threats, and because of 
 
 26. Quinn, supra note 3, at 65. 
 27. Spinak, supra note 3, at 16. 
 28. Id. at 17. 
 29. See Kang, supra note 7, at 138 (noting that courts are not the best forum for 
environmental justice and that lawyers often call the shots, thereby disempowering the 
litigants). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/2
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the multiple players involved in creating and solving environmental 
injustices.
30
  
Liz Hubertz’s careful analysis of the difference between lawyers’ 
and engineers’ ethical obligations and professional orientations 
provides another perspective on the interdisciplinary approach to 
legal and social problems. Her focus is not on the methodologies of 
the professions, but instead on their ethical orientations and duties. 
Lawyers, she notes, have strong duties to their clients, duties that can 
override duties to others. Engineers’ highest duty, on the other hand, 
is to the public, not their clients.
31
 Hubertz’s analysis illustrates that 
these differences are not insurmountable and do not preclude 
engineers and lawyers from working together in pursuit of 
environmental or other justice,
32
 but these differences reflect the 
tensions in the problem-solving courts: the law and lawyers are 
heavily concerned with protecting rights, while science has a less 
partisan duty to what some might identify as the truth, or what others 
might identify as the public good. Lawyers might say their calling is 
to their clients’ truth. 
 
These Articles, individually and collectively, offer new, 
important, and critical insights into access to, and the equality of, 
justice, particularly for those litigants whose limited social and 
economic power and authority propel them to courts to resolve 
problems that might for others be informally negotiated. These 
insights should inform and guide assessment of what problems courts 
are competent to resolve and what should be the reach of their 
jurisdiction over the lives of individuals, families, and communities. 
 
 30. Kang, supra note 7, at 139. 
 31. Hubertz, supra note 5. 
 32. Id. at 104–19. 
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